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One of the primary responsibilities of the national legislature is super-
vision of the executive branch of government. In the usual phrasing, Congress 1
supervisory role consists of questioning, reviewing and assessing, and modi-
fying or rejecting policies of the Administration. The proper limits, how-
ever, of legislative intervention in administrative affairs have long been a
subject of debate.
A relatively recent manifestation of the continuing evolution of legis-
lative procedures which bear on the responsibility mentioned above is the
so-called Russell amendment to the Military Construction Authorization Act of
1959. This paper will investigate and evaluate the significance of the
Russell amendment by means of an examination of the RS-70 controversy of 1961-
1962. The RS-70 bomber controversy arose during the program authorization
hearings before the House Committee on Armed Services.
The broad objective of this paper is to determine whether or not the
Russell amendment significantly contributes to the effectiveness of the
legislative process in the sphere of national security. The vehicle for
analysis will be the RS-70 controversy, chosen because it represents the first
important test of the procedural innovation created by the Russell amendment.
The influence of Congress in shaping national defense policy is substan-
tial, but it is accomplished in a very complex manner, normally through the
process of budgetary review. The Russell amendment altered this process
}
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in so doing altered the balance of power within the committee structures of
both House and Senate. To properly analyze the effect of this amendment, as
illustrated in the RS-70 issue, a substantial number of pertinent factors and
influences must be reviewed to set the political and institutional scene for
the events of that time.
In similar fashion, the RS-70 issue itself was an extremely complex
matter, involving all the many ramifications of the military research and
development programs, the question of roles and missions for the three services,
and larger strategic questions arising out of the cold war between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Here again, a good deal of background must be
filled in to place the RS-70 issue in its proper military and political per-
spective.
This paper will attempt to outline broadly Congress' role in national
defense policy formulation, with emphasis on the post World War II period.
This discussion will be followed by a similar review of the origins of the
Russell amendment and the RS-70 bomber controversy.
With this background established, the series of events which proposed and
finally settled the RS-70 bomber question will be described, with emphasis on
the hearings and proceedings of the Spring of 1962. Following this narrative
section will be an analysis of the elements of the RS-70 issue, and the effects




Section Eight of Article One of the United States Constitution enumerates
in eighteen clauses a series of specific subjects over which power is expressly
2
granted to the Congress. Three of these subsections pertain to the armed
forces of the United States:
12. to raise and support armies; but no appropriation
of money to that use shall be for a longer term
than two years;
13. to provide and maintain a navy;
14. to make rules for the government and regulation
of the land and naval forces;
3
The writers of the Constitution established a separation of powers by
providing for a Congress and a President on the same legal plane, then blurred
the separation by giving each certain rights to check or influence the
activities of the other. The correct interpretation of this doctrine is that




Section Two of Article Two states, in part, that
The President shall be commander in chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of
the several states, when called into active service
of the United States.
5
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The division of labor with regard to the armed forces is thereby clearly
spelled out. Congress' function is to raise an army and a navy, and to pay
for them, by means of its associated powers of taxation and appropriation.
The President, on the other hand, commands the forces which Congress creates.
While the Constitution thus set in motion the establishment of armed
forces in the United States, it has remained for succeeding generations of
government to make the system work. Historically, the major problem has been
one of achieving the balance required to maintain civilian control of the
armed forces, in accordance with the Constitution, and yet encourage the
development and utilization of military expertise and proficiency.
The three military services have, over the years, grown in political and
administrative significance. During the first years of the American Republic,
all the military functions were centered in one department, the War Department.
There were a few frigates in the service of the military, but these were con-
trolled through this one department until 1798, when Congress passed legisla-
tion establishing the Navy Department. The National Security Act of 1947
further expanded the organizations of the Armed Forces by creating a department
of the Air Force. This act was amended in 1949 to create one single department
of Defense, which incorporated all three services.
S. P. Huntington has advanced the theory that the key to understanding the
historical question of control of the military establishment lies in that word
"establishment." Huntington argues that the framers of the Constitution never






foresaw the rise of a professional, standing military structure, and thus pro-
vided no procedure for effective civilian control and direction of such an
establishment. The only workable solution was to create executive departments,
as mentioned above, under the control of the President, using the authority of
the Commander in Chief clause. Congress would then be able, at least theoret-
ically, to exercise its control function through the power of the appropria-
tions process.
In 1789 a reasonable expectation existed that Congress could effectively
exercise its military powers without much outside guidance or assistance.
Through its own investigations, it could be expected to determine the kinds of
armed forces required for the nation's defenses and to implement the President's
9foreign policies. The advances of science, modern weapons, and America's
place in the global power structure has rendered the congressional supervision
of the eighteenth century obsolete in terms of its ability to deal with the
military issues of contemporary times. These same advances, however, have not
in any way diminished Congress' responsibilities in this important area.
Large, well organized, and technically competent bureaucratic structures
have been required to fulfill the demands of military policy making and adminis-
tration. The dominant feature of a bureaucracy is its executive arrangements
of decision making, a feature which does not lend itself well to control
through a legislative process. Congress has had to come to terms with execu-
tive leadership in military affairs, and has done so by channeling its
o
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supervisory efforts into the process of appropriations review, which has been
the procedural responsibility of the Appropriations Committees of both Houses.
While the Constitution vested supreme lawmaking power in the legislative
branch as a whole, it did not provide suitable procedural arrangements for the
management of this power. In practice, therefore, legislative committees have
come to occupy positions of great and crucial importance in both Houses of
Congress. The complexity of legislation, the sheer volume of bills, and the
fact that committees facilitate negotiation in Congress have all contributed
11
to the prominence of committees.
The Appropriations Committees of Congress have become, over the years,
the most influential bodies within the committee system, because money is the
prime mover of the entire legislative process. But before actual appropria-
tions of funds can occur, other committees in each House must enact legislation
which authorizes particular programs and activities of the executive depart-
ments. Thus, the overall appropriations process has a dual nature, because
congressional action must occur in two steps: first, in the enactment of the
basic legislation ordering or permitting the government to undertake a specific
program, and, second, in the annual making of an appropriation or other obli-
12gational authority to fund that program.
In effect, then, there are two separate structures of power existing in
parallel within each House. The division of labor between authorization and
appropriation procedures has the potential for tension within the congressional
13
committee system, primarily because, although the substantive committees may













authorize a program, the appropriations groups are under no constitutional
14
obligation to complete the process and fund that program, a fact which
serves to reinforce the political power of the appropriations committees, par-
ticularly, in respect to military affairs, in the House of Representatives.
Prior to 1946, the legislative committees which considered the annual
military budget requests were the Naval Affairs Committee, for the Navy, and
the Military Affairs Committee, for the Army and Army Air Forces. Between the
79th and 80th Congresses, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 took
effect, which served to substantially streamline the committee structure in
both the House and Senate.
Thirty-three committees in the Senate were consolidated into fifteen, and
in the House, forty-eight committees were regrouped into nineteen new commitees.
In each House, the Naval Affairs and Military Affairs committees were consoli-
dated into a single committee called the Armed Services Committee. In rela-
tion to the Appropriations Committee, the Armed Services Committee became the
substantive committee for military affairs. The Armed Services Committee's
function was to authorize the broad programs for the services, while the sub-
committees on defense of the Appropriations Committees legislated the dollars
needed to carry out the military programs authorized.
While the 1946 reorganization of congressional committees represented an
overall streamlining of the committee structure, the consolidation of the mili-
tary committees was also due to the evolving centralization that had taken place
14
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8within the military establishment. The 1946 congressional reorganization anti-
cipated by one year the reorganization of the armed forces into three depart-
ments, which was followed two years later by a consolidation of those three
departments into the single Department of Defense.
The increasing size and centralization of the military establishment,
combined with expanding American international responsibilities arising out of
the cold war with the Soviet Union, compounded Congress' problem of fulfilling
its constitutional responsibilities with regard to defense matters. Military
budgets in the early fifties began to reflect the era of increasing inter-
national tensions, and the task of effective cooperation between Congress and
the Executive Branch became an increasingly important factor in the outcome of
the conflict with Russia. A sense of bi-partisanship developed in Congress
during this era which tended to put national security beyond the realm of
normal partisan politics.
There were several factors which bore on the changing relationship be-
tween Congress and the Executive Branch. The tension between the United States
and the Soviet Union was not a declared war, but something between a hot war
and a cold war. The United States, because of its predominant military-
economic position after World War II, was the acknowledged leader of the tree
world. A third factor was the increasing cost of America's international
commitments, which carried a price tag in men and material heavy enough to
have a substantial effect on the domestic economy. A fourth factor was the
growing complexity of international problems which made congressional-
executive teamwork a difficult matter. And, finally, there was the element
of time in the nuclear age of push-button warfare and international crises
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which always had the potential for escalating into global conflict.
The Korean War of 1950 was typical of the suddenness with which a major
conflict could erupt, and symptomatic as well of the changing nature of inter-
national conflict. It was an undeclared war, and the United States partici-
pated in hostilities under the flag of the United Nations.
Paralleling the rising international tensions in the fifties was the
technical revolution in the fields of military technology and weapons produc-
tion. Strategic concepts underwent profound change with the advent of inter-
continental bomber, and later, missile systems. The new technology, however,
came with a high price tag. The military budget rose from a level of $13.5
billion in 1950 to nearly $50 billion in 1952. The Korean War accounted for
about half of this rise, through supplemental appropriations passed for the
1 o
war, but the rising costs of military equipment were dramatic.
The shadow of a New Look in defense spending was cast over the Pentagon
by the election of General Eisenhower in 1952. Candidate Eisenhower had
promised the nation economy of operation, a more effective military posture,
and a substantial cut in the defense budget. The armistice in Korea, coming
in July of 1953, permitted the new President to make good on his promises of a
New Look in defense posture, and, over the next two years, the Eisenhower
19
administration cut back the Defense budget to the $30 billion level.
Daniel S. Cheever, H. Field Haviland, Jr., American Foreign Policy and











The spending levels of the Eisenhower administration reflected a change
in overall defense strategy, from that of emphasizing conventional warfare
capability to one which relied primarily on a doctrine of massive retaliation
with nuclear weapons as a posture of deterrence. The emphasis of the New Look
20
was on air power and a drastically reduced army man-power level. The think-
ing was that nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems made conventional
armies obsolete. In the main, Congress concurred with the policies of the New
Look in its early years.
The principal concern of the New Look policy seemed to be the dollar ceil-
ing on the annual Defense budget. President Eisenhower had promised to trim
the Defense budget, and he did so. His administration cut the Defense budget
by 10 percent for fiscal 1954, by 16 percent for fiscal 1955, and by 13 percent
for fiscal 1956, as revealed in a Senate hearing conducted in 1956 on the sub-
21ject of strategic air power. The Soviet Union, in the meanwhile, had shown
no signs of letting up in its drive to achieve military parity with the United
States in this same time period. At a time when the United States was relying
upon a doctrine of massive retaliation to deter the Soviets from any major war,
the Soviets were moving quickly to negate that doctrine by creating a more power-
ful nuclear force than the United States had.
A factor which was to begin to reverse the trend of the Eisenhower adminis-
tration's defense policies was the changing political alignment in Congress.
When Eisenhower was elected, the Republican party was in the majority in both












party controlled Congress, and the Democrats were to continue in majority
control for the remainder of the Eisenhower years. The early and solid accept-
ance of the New Look defense policy in Congress changed slowly throughout the
six-year period of Democratic party control to a breakup of the congressional
22
consensus which had approved that doctrine. Congressional influence was
exercised ultimately through the efforts of an increasing number of legislators
who strove to understand and deal with the economic and fiscal policies under-
lying the nation's military programs. Budgetary limitations established with-
out reference to military requirements, and military requirements generated
without reference to the budgetary process were acknowledged to have been the
most significant hindrances to the development of realistic strategic military
23
policies and supporting programs in the fifties.
The important thing to be noted about the decade of the fifties was that
it was a decade of very rapid change which involved the whole spectrum of mili-
tary affairs. The cold war with the Soviet Union, punctuated by the Korean
conflict, had put severe and continuing pressure on the United States to assume
a position of global leadership that necessarily had to be backed up by global
military power. Foreign policy and military policy became inseparable as never
before in their formulation, and the urgency of the times accentuated the execu-
tive nature of national policy making.
22
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The necessity for keeping pace with the rapid advance of military tech-
nology, and the attendant costs of that technology, had its greatest impact
in Congress on the Appropriations committees, for the defense sub-committees
of Appropriations were faced with the annual task of reviewing the increasing-
ly larger defense budget requests. Procurement of major weapons systems be-
came the most substantial part of the annual defense budget, for two reasons.
For Congress, the procurement package represented the largest dollar portion
of the military budget. For the individual services, the procurement of
weapons systems became the major vehicle by which individual services could
compete for roles in the nuclear age.
The power of the Appropriations committees to make budgetary decisions
has been in a sense dependent upon the ability of the members to keep the sys-
tem going by meeting the needs of other congressmen, who tend to listen to the
expert committees, particularly in the case of the very complex defense budget
requests. The budget review is a very specialized business, which means that
sub-committees break up the annual federal budget and review it according to
24
their subject specialty. The review which the defense sub-committees of the
general Appropriations Committee gave the annual defense budget was usually
quite thorough.
On the other hand, the roles of the Armed Services committees in Congress
had been largely relegated to the background of the legislative process in the
years after World War II. Legislative authorizations for the procurement of
aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels, were cast in such vague legislative terms






and the ceilings on their acquisitions were set so high that they provided
25little or no guidance for the Appropriations committees.
The armed services committees did maintain their prerogatives over mili-
tary pay and personnel, and military construction, while review responsibility
for military assistance programs was granted to the foreign affairs committees.
The armed services committees gradually discovered, however, that their passage
of pay and personnel legislation had little direct effect on defense policy and
on the nation's strategic posture, because it was military procurement, i.e.,
the hardware authorizations, which determined what the nation's military strat-
9 ft
egy could be. The only place that that procurement was really examined in
the defense subcommittees of the appropriations committees, in the choice of
27hugely expensive weapons systems.
The size and technical complexity of weapons systems and force level fund-
ing requests in the annual defense budget were a good deal more than the aver-
age congressman could grasp in any comprehensive sense. The defense budgets
were constructed with more regard to departmental convenience than for the
I
need to inform congressmen sufficiently to enable them to make adequate policy
28
decisions. This was not an intentional failing, but rather a consequence of
the fact that a budget is in essence an executive planning device.
25


















The salient characteristic of the congressional process in reviewing
defense budgets was its highly decentralized nature. No one body in either
House of Congress had as its sole duty the consideration and formulation of the
structure of the armed forces of the United States, which process is implied
in the Constitution. Military budgets were processed through Congress in such
a way that a comprehensive picture of national defense policies could not be
29derived at any one point in the process.
And yet while the congressional process after World War II was essentially
a decentralized process, the organization whose budgets Congress was reviewing
had become increasingly centralized under the office of the Secretary of
Defense. The clarification and strengthening of the authority of the Secretary
of Defense over the entire defense structure had been the basic theme of de-
velopment in the defense organization since 1947. The process had been evolu-
tionary, and sought to combine centralization of authority in the Secretary of
Defense with substantial retention of traditional service structures in support
30
of combatant forces. Defense organizational changes continued after 1947,
and were supplemented and even overshadowed by improved management procedures.
Members of Congress were aware of the seeming imbalance in policy initia-
tive towards the end of the fifties. Some indication of the thinking in Con-
gress is evident in the report of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on
the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. The report recognized the central












scene, and declared that if Congress were to exercise its constitutional
responsibility, it must gain a more meaningful measure of control over the
31
structure of the combatant forces it would create.
In the Senate, moreover, other factors were at work which presaged a
greater involvement of the Armed Services Committee in defense affairs. It
had been apparent for several years that changes in major weapons programs
—
known as reprogramming—were a source of considerable congressional irritation.
Senators Sparkman and Stennis in particular had criticized the Department of
Defense for suddenly reducing (or cancelling altogether) programs for which
only months earlier high military witnesses had pleaded hotly in the appropria-
tion hearings. No senator was against reprogramming per se, but in many
instances basic alterations had been made without any prior notification to
32
Congress.
On the House side, the Armed Services Committee, chaired by the very
senior Representative Carl Vinson, had seen most of their former pre-eminence
eroded, seemingly by default, to the appropriations subcommittees on defense
33
matters. As the national defense budget came to represent an increasingly
larger share of the total national budget, its political significance rose in
proportion. The familiar tension between the Appropriations Committee and any
substantive committee was reinforced in the case of the Armed Services Committee,
31
U.S. Congress, Senate, The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 , S. Rept.
1765, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958, p. 40.
32
B. K. Gordon, "The Military Budget: Congressional Phase," in Journal
of Politics
,







The special privileges which accrued to the Committee on Appropriations, the
very small size of its subcommittees, its closed-door and of f-the-record
method of holding hearings, and finally, the sheer power of its control over
funds, all accentuated the jealousy with which substantive committees regarded
34
the appropriations group in the House.
Section 412(b) of the Military Construction Authorization Act for fiscal
1960 significantly modified the arrangement whereby only the defense sub-
committees of the Appropriations Committee fully reviewed the annual military
budget requests. It introduced the Armed Services committees once more into
35
the center of the annual defense budgeting and programming process.
This section of the Construction Authorization Act became known as the
Russell Amendment, since it was introduced by Senator Richard Russell, then
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The section directed that
No funds may be appropriated after December 31, 1960
to or for the use of any armed force of the United
States for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, or
naval vessels unless the appropriation of such funds
has been authorized by legislation enacted after such
date. 36
Senator Russell was solicitous about the apparent decline in American mili-
tary strength in the late fifties. He was aware also of the difficulties Con-
gress faced when it attempted to improve the nation's defense posture, without
the active support of the President. He became convinced that the annual
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operations, and costs of the military establishment. Just as importantly,
he realized that, since they resulted in no specific legislation, the posture
briefings were discounted in importance by committee members and other legis-
37lators. Section 412(b) was an obvious solution.
Chairman Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee was initially opposed
to the Russell Amendment, because of his doubts that his committee and its
staff would be able to discharge the additional responsibilities implicit in
Section 412(b). In the conference committee on the Military Construction
Authorization Act, however, Vinson acceded to pressure from both the Senate
Armed Services Committee and members of his own Armed Services Committee, and
agreed to support the amendment. The Russell Amendment served to quicken the
awareness of many House members to the opportunity for assertion of committee
power and responsibility.
Opposition to the new procedure was centered in the Pentagon. The Russell
Amendment meant that Pentagon officials would now have to present their pro-
curement programs twice, once before the Armed Services committees, and again
to the defense subcommittees of the Appropriations committees. Pentagon offi-
cials claimed that there would be serious delays imposed by the new procedure,
particularly if there was any disagreement between the two committees of both
House and Senate.
It must be noted that this procedure was not something that was totally new
in Congress, since all departments must do essentially the same thing, i.e.,
37










present testimony to both a substantive and an appropriations committee in
each House of Congress. In fact, however, it was something new for defense,
because the Defense Department had been accustomed to making a toatlly differ-
ent presentation before the Armed Services Committees.
Prior to the Russell Amendment, the Defense Department appeared before
the Armed Services Committees in what was called the Military Posture Hearings.
At these hearings, a sort of military state of the union presentation was
given, along with the department's pay and personnel budget requests. The
subject of major weapons procurement was reserved for testimony before the
Appropriations groups, on the theory that these were more purely money requests
than anything else. Thus while the department was already going through the
same process as all other departments, i.e., a substantive committee for
authorization, and an appropriations committee for funds, in fact the major
weapons systems were going only to appropriations, bypassing the armed services
committees. This was being done mostly as a result of a procedural agreement
between the Armed Services Committees and the Defense Department. The net
result of the Russell Amendment was, therefore, that the lengthy and detailed
weapons procurement briefings would now have to go through the Armed Services
Committee as well as the Appropriations Committee, which was in fact what had
been legally required all along of all other executive departments.
Another factor mentioned was that the new procedure would necessitate that
internal differences between the services regarding weapons programs would now
have to be more intensively ironed out before the congressional stage of the
budget was reached, which implied a further centralization of power under the
Secretary of Defense. Some members of Congress were apprehensive about the
prospect. Congressman H. Sheppard, senior member of the House Appropriations
Defense Sub-committee, regarded that possibility with great trepidation. The
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ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Paul
Kilday, commented that one of the basic reasons for the new procedure was to
39
get better planning in the Executive Branch. The corollarly to "better
planning" was the strong possibility that any military disagreements with the
civilian management in the Pentagon would be kept from Congress, and congress-
men wanted to hear both sides of any arguments over procurement.
An Assistant Secretary of Defense noted, in August, 1960, that the com-
mittee staffs of both Armed Services Committees were inexperienced in prepar-
ing the type of questions which would be able to penetrate well-constructed
Defense Department presentations. It was also noted that Pentagon procurement
officers would have a difficult time in contract negotiation if Congress had
already tied dollars to programs.
The Russell Amendment was expected to open the way for an expansion of
the congressional role in military policy in three ways. It would supposedly
strengthen the access of Congress to the process of policy formulation. It
would provide a utility of focus for the committees on the major programs in
the annual defense budget, and would reveal the relative allocation of re-
sources to preparedness for limited and general war, the relative utility of
varying types of strategies of deterrence, and the proper mix of roles and
missions of the three services relative to these various policy objectives.
And finally, the authorization procedure was expected to create an expanded
39











base of knowledge in Congress for critical analysis of major defense issues.
The election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 and the inauguration of his
Democratic Administration in 1961 marked a turning point in the development of
American strategic military doctrine. For the first time in six years, the
same party controlled in both the White House and Congress. After the
tulmultuous decade of the fifties, the general consensus in Congress was that
American military might had slipped badly under the Eisenhower Administration,
and that it was time to do something about it. The campaign in 1960 had
developed this issue clearly, and with the Kennedy Administration there began
a revitalization of American armed forces.
The Russell Amendment went into effect in 1961, and this coincided with
the beginning of the Kennedy Administration. Congressional innovation and
intervention in defense policy was to collide head-on with executive innova-
tion in defense management in the fall of 1961.
The Kennedy Administration brought Robert S. McNamara to the Department
of Defense as its new chief executive officer. Secretary McNamara was con-
vinced that the nation had to improve its strategic nuclear forces, even as it
altered the emphasis of reliance for national security in favor of more con-
ventional forces. McNamara' s analysis had concluded that strategic nuclear
forces were no longer a credible deterrent to the broad range of aggression,
if indeed they ever had been in the past. Additionally, he decided that
nuclear weapons were not perfect substitutes for conventional forces in the
41









The major effort initiated in the Pentagon by the new Secretary of Defense,
however, was the drive to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Defense
management. This effort was divided into two parts: the first a series of
management reforms, covered by a formal five-year cost reduction plan set up in
July, 1962. The objective of this plan was to save money by introducing more
efficient methods of doing things. The second and more important part of the
overall effort was to increase military effectiveness.
McNamara discovered that the three military services had been establish-
ing their procurement requirements independently of each other, and that the
resulting requirements bore almost no relation to each other in terms of pre-
paredness for war. The new Secretary introduced the planning-programming-budget-
ing system into the Defense Department. The program budget proposed to group
together for planning purposes military units which would have to fight to-
gether in the event of a major war, i.e., strategic forces with other strat-
egic forces, and general purpose forces with other conventional forces, regard-
less of service origin. In this way it was hoped that weapons procurement
could be examined in the light of what the new weapons system would contribute
to its unique functional area, and thus could be better evaluated in terms which
had some common denominator , since adding a weapon to the inventory did not
42





necessarily add to national security in proportion to what it might
43
cost to develop and produce that weapon.
The introduction of the PPB system in the Defense Department paralleled
the implementation of the Russell Amendment. Both procedures addressed them-
selves to weapons systems procurement. McNamara felt that the program budget
would permit top management in the Defense Department as well as in Congress to
focus their attention on tasks and missions related to national objectives,
rather than on the tasks and missions of a particular service.
The Russell Amendment was implemented procedurally in 1961, with con-
sideration of the FY 1962 budget. It was agreed between the Defense Depart-
ment and the Armed Services Committees that the annual authorization bill
would be presented with all requests for obligational authority tabulated
under headings such as Navy aircraft, Air Force missiles, Army missiles, etc.,
and that program authorizations would be made in lump sums. The Armed Ser-
vices Committees would receive in hearings essentially the same information
which the Defense Sub-committees of the Appropriations Committees did, with
respect to procurement programs.
The Russell Amendment was supposed to return the Armed Services Committees
to the mainstream of national defense policy making. The question which arose
almost immediately was how much influence would the committees be able to bring
to bear in passing on the annual defense budget requests. The first significant
test of the limits of the Russell Amendment came in consideration of the FY 1962
Defense budget requests, and, ironically, the roles in the dispute which arose







supersonic bomber, which the new Secretary of Defense had decided not to pro-
cure. The House Armed Services Committee thought otherwise, and decided to
take issue with the Secretary of Defense, and to use the procedural avenue




Before considering the B-70 controversy in detail, a small digression is
necessary. The B-70 bomber was, for most of its existence, involved in the
process of military research and development, popularly known as R & D.
Military R & D is a very complicated business, with manifold problems for
both policy makers and politicians. There is the basic problem of making
technological progress, and doing so before one's enemy does. There is the
problem of incorporating advances in basic technology into operational hard-
ware. And finally, there is the most vexing problem of determining how much
of the nation's resources should be allocated to R & D, whether military or
business oriented, due to the inherent uncertainties in any research program.
There are four broad classifications of military R&D. The first cate-
gory is weapons system development
,
which is directed toward the fabrication
for testing of prototypes for operational weapons. The term weapons system
in this context is used in a narrower sense than in systems analysis, and it
includes the major equipment, such as a bomber aircraft, and such auxiliary
equipment as power plants, bombing navigation systems, other electronic equip-
ment, and armament, but would not necessarily include an operational concept,
or base system, or personnel training program.
Component development is the more or less independent development of
items of military hardware, which are not in themselves complete weapons
systems. Services can and do spend money productively developing engines for
aircraft, guidance systems for missiles, gyroscopes for guidance systems, and
so on, without knowing precisely the type or model of the major equipment of
which the component will eventually be a part.

25
In exploratory development , or applied research , the objective is to
advance the state of the technological art rather than obtaining immediately
operational hardware. This may involve a laboratory experiment, a wind tunnel
test, or the construction of a working model, depending upon the nature of the
idea.
Basic research is the deliberate search for knowledge. The military ser-
vices, as well as other government agencies, support a good deal of basic
research, such as studies in basic physics, aerodynamics, and some branches of
applied mathematics. Basic research is typically the least expensive type of
44
research and development, and the least structured or directed.
Research and development is characterized by uncertainty and unpredict-
ability at every stage in its search for knowledge, and flexibility in the
45
various stages of a research and development program is essential. The
decision to move into the weapons development stage represents a fairly sub-
stantial commitment to the program under development. Should the particular
system fail to meet performance specifications when the prototype is tested,
the government stands to sustain a considerable loss, depending upon the
financial magnitude of the program. Thus the policy decision to stage a pro-
gram into weapons development is a very critical step, which presupposes that
enough research has been done to assure technical feasibility, and that the
contractor can indeed fulfill his contract under the budgeted costs and price.
44
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A factor which complicates research and development decisions is the
factor of time. Development decisions on bombers which are to be operational
by 1970 must be made in 1960, which makes such decisions very vulnerable to
46
the technical uncertainties mentioned earlier. Military hardware which is
developing at the frontier of technical know-how takes literally years to per-
fect and produce. A single holdup in any one part of an entire weapons system
can initiate a cascade of delays throughout the rest of the project, thus
further aggravating the time problem.
As all military R&D projects are conducted within budgetary restraints,
the costs of developing a weapons system are probably the most important con-
sideration next to achieving the development objectives themselves. The
method by which the armed forces have contracted with industry to get develop-
ment projects under way, however, has not always been conducive to keeping
costs to a minimum.
Throughout the fifties, there was a presumption that competitive forces,
working through the price and market mechanism, would provide the same spur to
efficiency and low cost operation that they did in the private economy. But
only a rather small portion of service purchases actually were made on the
basis of truly competitive bidding, especially in the late fifties. The expen-
sive items, such as major equipment like aircraft, submarines, and tanks and
their expensive major components could be produced by only a few companies,
and their production costs were seldom accurately estimated in advance. More-
over, frequent and extensive modifications of the original design were the
rule rather than the exception both in development and in production. In
46






these circumstances, negotiated contracts of the cost-plus type were widely
A 47used.
Rigid government controls on the development process often went so far as
to specify not only what but how and by whom all the work would be done. There
was little incentive to produce efficiently and cheaply when all allowable
costs were reimbursed and allowed profits were fixed in advance. There was
little scope for business initiative when firms were rigidly controlled in
the name of preventing waste or fraud. These factors led to experimentation
with the so-called incentive contracts, which permitted the contractor to keep
some percentage of any cost savings in the development work, based on some
48
previously arrived at figure or cost estimate. The basic problem remained,
however, to compute the overall program cost estimate, which the inherent
uncertainties of R & D made extremely difficult. The ultimate objective of
any contractor was a production contract for the final weapons system, which
gave that contractor a real incentive to minimize his cost estimates in order
to secure that final production contract.





installation and training costs
,
and attrition and operating costs . To make a realistic estimate of the total
cost of a program, each of these components must be either computed or esti-
mated. To make an optimal choice between two weapons systems which will
achieve essentially the same military objective, the total costs must be








At the time of the B-70 controversy, America's strategic forces con-
sisted of a mix of medium and long-range manned bombers (B-47, B-52, and
B-58) , and a growing number of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In addi-
tion there was the Navy's attack carrier striking force, deployed around the
world. The B-70 bomber was to be a follow-on aircraft for the Air Force
Strategic Air Command when the B-52 and B-58 forces had to be retired due to
age.
Actual development work was begun on the B-70 aircraft in October, 1954,
when the Air Force published a general operational requirement for an "inter-
continental bombardment system piloted bomber," to join the operational inven-
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tory in the time frame 1965-1975. In 1954, the aircraft was called the
"chemical bomber," because its performance parameters envisioned the use of
exotic chemical fuels instead of hydrocarbon fuels then in existence.
The chemical bomber was to be a giant aircraft, weighing 250 tons and
capable of speeds in excess of 2200 miles per hour. It was designed to operate
at the very fringe of the earth's atmosphere, and to carry nuclear loads over
intercontinental distances. It was popularly dubbed the "manned missile."
Such flight parameters presented formidable technical problems. Very
little was known about flight at such velocities and in a partial vacuum.
Metallurgic solutions to the problems of aerodynamic loading and heating which
would be experienced had yet to be found when the aircraft was initially con-
ceived. The fuel for the B-70 had yet to be invented, and there was a good
49
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deal of uncertainty that this aircraft could be built at all. The only thing
that was certain about the aircraft was that it would be the most expensive
bomber ever produced by anybody. The North American Aviation Company was
named as prime contractor for the major system, and the aircraft was officially
designated as the B-70 bomber.
In 1960, the Eisenhower Administration decided to upgrade the project to
the weapons development stage. Appropriate funding was requested to produce
some operational prototypes for further testing. The B-70 remained at the
weapons development level for only one year, however, due to the change in
administrations which took place in 1961.
President Kennedy had given certain instructions to his new Secretary of
Defense, which included a thorough review of all current and projected plans
and projects within the Department of Defense. The President mentioned these
instructions in his State of the Union address, stating that
We are moving into a period of uncertain risk and
great commitment in which both military and diplomatic
possibilities require a free world force so powerful
as to make any aggression clearly futile...
I have therefore instructed the Secretary of Defense
to re-appraise our entire defense strategy—our ability
to fulfill our commitments— the effectiveness, vulner-
ability and dispersal of our strategic bases, forces and
warning systems— the efficiency and economy of our operation
and organization— the elimination of obsolete bases and
installations—and the adequacy, modernization, and mo-
bility of our present conventional and nuclear forces and











Secretary McNaraara had received two amplifying directives from the
President regarding the broad direction of the Administration in defense
affairs. He was told to develop the force structure necessary to the nation's
military requirements without regard to arbitrary or predetermined budget
53
ceilings. The second was, having done that, to procure that force structure
54
at the least possible cost.
McNamara's broad criterion for accepting or rejecting a new major weapons
system was that the proposed system would really have to add something to the
nation's security. The B-70 bomber system failed to meet this basic require-
ment, primarily because it added little in proportion to its great cost, which
was projected as at least ten billions for development, procurement, and opera-
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tions of a modest force of the giant bombers. As McNamara saw it, the B-70
was just another bomber, subject to all the vulnerabilities of an aircraft and
having none of the advantages of an intercontinental ballistic missile, which
could accomplish the same military mission.
The decision was made to downgrade the B-70 program from weapons system
development to a prototype research level. Budget requests for continuation
of the program were reduced correspondingly. When the President presented his
revised budget estimates to Congress in March, 1961, he described briefly some
of the technical uncertainties surrounding the project, and amended his
53
In contrast to the Eisenhower policy of setting firm budgetary ceilings
on defense spending, and then getting what defense they could from that amount
of money.
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funding requests for the B-70, cutting the figure from $358 million to $220
million.
The appropriations bill for FY 1962 was approved by Congress early in
August, 1961, and it carried increases over administration funding requests
of $180 million for further development of the B-70 program. Congress
evidently believed that the manned bomber program was still very important,
even though the Administration was more interested in transitioning the
CO
nation's force structure to ICBM's in place of bombers.
In October, 1961, Secretary McNamara announced that he would not spend
the additional funds voted by Congress for additional bombers or for upgrading
of the development of the B-70 weapons system. He listed three main objec-
tions, the first being that more bombers would not add to national security
in proportion to their costs. McNamara further objected to bombers because
they presented a soft target for ICBM's, and thus would require an early and
forewarned launch. And, finally, he asserted that the B-70 in particular was
59
much too expensive a program to be continued.
The Defense Department submitted a budget request of $170 million for the
continued development of a prototype B-70 to the House Committee on Armed
U.S. Congress, House, United States Defense Policies in 1961 , H. Doc.
123, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962; p. 11.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Report, Department
of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1962 , S. Rept. 653, 87th Cong., 1st
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58





U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Military
Posture
, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 3174.

32
Services in February, 1962, for FY 1963. The Air Force had changed the
designation of the aircraft from B-70 to RS-70 to describe its expanded role
as a reconnaisance-strike bomber. During the hearings before the House
Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force
Chief of Staff urged that the prototype program be expanded to build a total
of six RS-70 aircraft. Their cost estimates for building six aircraft were
on the order of $1.3 billion. Their testimony tended to contradict that of
their superior, Secretary McNamara, and ensured a good deal of misgivings in
the committee as to what indeed the Defense Department had in mind for this
project.
The House Committee Report was released in March, 1962. The report re-
vealed that the committee had added $320 million to the $170 million Defense
requested for the RS-70 program, and that the committee was directing the
Secretary of the Air Force to spend the entirety of the authorized funds on
the RS-70 program.
The report of the committee stated
The Secretary of the Air Force is directed to utilize
authorization in an amount not less than $491 million
during fiscal 1963 to proceed with production planning
and long leadtime procurement for an RS-70 weapons
system.
As if to ensure that there would be no ambiguity in the interpretation of their
report, the committee went on to say
Congressional Quarterly Digest, 1962
; p. 417.
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the purpose of a committee report is to render clear
exactly what the law is intended to accomplish. Lest
there be any doubts as to what the RS-70 amendment
means, let it be said that it means exactly what it
says, i.e., that the Secretary of the Air Force, as an
official of the Executive Branch, is directed, ordered
mandated and required to utilize the full amount of
$491 million authority granted to proceed with production
planning and long leadtime procurement for an RS-70 weapons
system. 62
And finally, as if to throw down a congressional gauntlet of challenge to the
Executive, the report concluded that
if this language constitutes a test of whether Congress
has the power to so mandate, let the test be made and
let this important weapons system be the field of trial.
The committee would also like to express the hope that
this mandate will provide the instrument whereby the
unanimity of feeling of the (armed services) committee ,._
and the Appropriations Committee can find its effectuation.
Neither the administrative direction nor the constitutional challenge by
the legislative branch to the Executive Branch was left in doubt in this
unusual report. Chairman Vinson's amendment to the basic bill directing an
executive official to spend money (which had not yet been appropriated) was a
marked departure from the normal legislative process.
The House Committee Report reviewed what it termed "recent history of
congressional enactions disregarded by the executive branch." It mentioned
two dramatic cases, the cancellation of a FORRESTAL supercarrier in 1950, and
the impounding of $615 million authorized for the procurement of fighter air-
craft in 1949. The report continued by citing a total of thirteen instances
in which congressional actions had been frustrated by noncompliance in the
64












1956: increase in Marine personnel strength ($46.4) millions)
1959: increased army modernization program ($37.0)
accelerated REGULUS submarine program ($11.0)
HOUND DOG missile program increases (48.0)
MINUTEMAN missile program increases ($90.0)
additional KC-135 air tankers ($55.6)
additional strategic transports ($140.0)
1960: maintaining marine corps strength ($43.1)
NIKE-ZEUS missile procurement ($137.0)
nuclear powered aircraft carrier ($35.0)
National Guard construction ($12.1)
1961: additional fighter aircraft ($97.0)
Army reserve construction ($4.0)
The Secretary of Defense had reserved $180 million from the B-70 program in
FY 1962, bringing the total of the amounts listed in the committee report to
$1.6 billion.
The committee report envisioned four tasks for the RS-70 bomber. It
would "observe and report on the condition of the enemy during and after
initial nuclear strikes, increase the assurance of the destruction of primary
targets, seek out and destroy unique targets, especially the extremely hard,
mobile, or the imprecisely located targets, and provide precision, discrimina-
tion, and flexibility for the nation's strategic strike forces."
Additionally, the report cited the legal precedent of Swain v. United
States (165 U.S. 553), in which the Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional
powers of the President on one hand to command the Army and Navy, and the powers
of Congress on the other to make rules for the governing and regulation of the
land and naval forces are distinct and separate powers. The Court concluded
that the President cannot evade legislative regulation, nor could Congress by







(The committee was attempting to lend the weight of legal precedent to
its case for directing the Executive Branch to spend money, but in so doing,
it had picked up a two-edged sword. The same decision could be interpreted
as meaning that the Congress could not by legislation impair the executive
function of spending authorized and appropriated funds.)
The report concluded with an appeal to the entire House of Representa-
tives to back the committee in this issue by stating, "when the amendment is
backed by a vote of the whole House, and the whole Congress, it is a mandate."
By this device, the committee was attempting to co-opt the entire House into
supporting the armed services committee's stand on the RS-70 issue, as well as
on the constitutional issue.
Secretary McNamara took his position before the public at a press con-
ference on 15 March 1962. In a 2500 word statement he laid out his reasoning
for curtailing the RS-70 project. He observed that the B-70 version of the
bomber had never enjoyed the full support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Secretary of Defense, or of the President and his Scientific Advisory Committee.
He noted that the B-70/RS-70 had all the vulnerabilities and disadvantages of
<-> 7
an aircraft, with no more flexibility than a guided missle.
He further noted that the RS-70 was not going to be capable of carrying
the stand-off ballistic missile planned for the existing B-52 bombers in inven-
tory (the SKYBOLT missile), and that the aircraft was going to be extremely
expensive, particularly when compared to the additional deterrence it would
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McNarama acknowledge that the Air Force had redesignated the aircraft
from B-70 to RS-70 to describe its expanded reconnaisance-strike capabilities,
but pointed out that the addition of the reconnaisance capability would only
add considerably to the expense of the aircraft, especially since the elec-
tronic hardware for the reconnaisance mission wouldn't be developed until
1970 at the earliest. He stated that, ultimately, if the post-strike recon-
naisance capability were considered to be that much of an addition to the
nation's force posture, those same reconnaisance systems could be put aboard
existing B-52 aircraft just as easily.
McNamara concluded that the addition of a force of 200 RS-70 aircraft, as
was proposed by the Air Force in 1961, would cost ten billion dollars, and
would not appreciably change the capabilities of the nation's overall deter-
rent. For these reasons, he had decided to continue the program at minimal
funding level for purposes of basic research. There were some possible appli-
cations from the project which might be useful in development of a supersonic
transport for commercial aviation, although this had not been conclusively
demonstrated.
In the week following the publication of the committee report, opposition
developed rather quickly to Vinson's Amendment. The most urgent pressure
against the amendment came from the members of the House Defense Sub-committee
of the Appropriations Committee, because the amendment represented a challenge
to the power of that committee. If the authorization bill were to become law,
with the amendment directing the Secretary of the Air Force to spend $491
million on the RS-70 program, then the appropriations process would be effec-
tively bypassed. Worded as the authorization bill was, the Appropriations
Committee would have had to appropriate the entire sum authorized in order that
the authorization be effected as law.
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The President quickly marshalled political support for his Administra-
tion's position on the RS-70 issue. House Speaker McCormack, House Minority
Leader Charles Halleck, and Majority Leader Carl Albert were reportedly ready
68
to oppose the Vinson Amendment when the bill reached the floor. Washington
editorial comment urged the House Armed Services Committee to drop the con-
stitutional issue and to pursue the RS-70 program on its merits, as had the
69Secretary of Defense in his news conference.
Members of the House Defense Sub-committee of the Appropriations Com-
mittee conferred with President Kennedy in order to determine the best
strategy to actually defeat Vinson's proposal. The President requested the
House Majority Leader and the Speaker to seek a compromise with Vinson.
Chairman Vinson had the unanimous support of his committee for his
amendment over the RS-70 program. Several members of the committee had
expressed concern with the future of manned bombers during the hearings on
the authorization bill. It appeared from the hearings, however, that only
the chairman himself was displeased specifically with the handling of the
RS-70 program.
It must be remembered that the Democrats controlled both Houses of Con-
gress at this time. Opposition to controversial legislation was to be
expected from the minority party, the Republicans in this case, but bi-
partisan opposition which included the House leadership spelled real trouble





U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Authorizing
Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels for the Armed Services
,
87th Cong., 2nd Sess., February, 1962.

38
On the day before House debate was to begin on the authorization bill,
President Kennedy sent Chairman Vinson a letter. In this note, the Presi-
dent stated
With the profoundest respect for your leadership in
national defense and congressional affairs, I must
take this opportunity to urge your reconsideration
of the language added by your committee to H.R.9751.
I would respectfully suggest, that, in place of the
word "directed," the word "authorized" would be more
suitable to an authorizing bill (which is not an
appropriation of funds) and more clearly in line with
the spirit of the Constitution.
Each branch of the government has a responsibility
to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution,
and the clear separation of legislative and executive
powers it requires. I must, therefore, insist upon the
full power and discretions essential to the faithful
execution of my responsibilities as Commander in
Chief. 71
The President went on to acknowledge that a "spirit of comity" ought to govern
relations between the two branches of government, but that this same spirit
made any legislative effort to direct the executive entirely unwise.
While this letter did address itself primarily to the constitutional
issue raised by the Armed Services Committee, the political import of the
letter was that the President was prepared to make a fight of the matter if
Chairman Vinson continued to press this issue. The President had spoken with
the full authority of his office, as well as with the authority of the leader
of the Democratic Party, of which Vinson was a member.
Representative Vinson also received a letter from the Secretary of
Defense. McNamara indicated that he was ordering a re-study of the RS-70






this study will give full consideration to the
magnitude of the (Armed Services) Committee pro-
gram and the depth with which the committee has
emphasized that program. 72
McNamara went on to .state that
if technological developments related to the side-view
radar, and associated data processing and display sys-
tems advance more rapidly than we anticipated. . .we
would then wish to expand whatever proportions of any
increase voted by Congress ... these advances would
warrant.
This was an important letter at this juncture in the dispute between
Vinson and the Administration, because it gave Vinson a way out, a method of
saving political face should he decide to give in to the mounting political
pressure against him.
Debate on H.R. 9751, the authorization bill, began on 21 March 1962.
Representative Gerald Ford (R-Mich.) led the opposition to Vinson's Amendment,
He stated that he was strongly opposed to language contained in the amendment
directing the Secretary of the Air Force to spend $491 million on the RS-70
program. He argued that such language was improper for three reasons
First, it invades the responsibilities of the Commander
in Chief as well as his jurisdiction as Chief Executive;
second, the language would usurp the appropriating author-
ity of the Committee on Appropriations; and
third, the language would create inflexibility in the
management of the RS-70 program. 73
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Ford's second objection was the most significant politically, and it became
the rallying point for consolidating opposition to Vinson's amendment.
Ford's reference to the jurisdictional autonomy of the appropriations
group touched the most sensitive congressional nerves. Legislators might
combine against the President on policy issues, but they were not likely to
do so at the expense of their own power in committees. Ford's statement
revealed that he was very jealous of the prerogatives of the Appropriations
Committee, of which he was an important member, and that he felt that Vinson
had overstepped the traditional jurisdiction of his own Armed Services Com-
mittee. Just as the legislative committees resent the actions of the Appro-
priations Committee to undo policies and to influence programs which have been
authorized, so does the appropriations group resent attempts by a Legislative
Committee to force appropriations.
Ford also rebutted Vinson's claim that the Executive Branch had a long
history of ignoring the will of Congress. He produced figures which revealed
that the President had followed the recommendations of Congress on twenty-
eight times during the same time frame cited in the Vinson report, and that
on nine of those occasions, had followed congressional direction to the
letter. His point was that Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had followed
7 fi
the recommendations of Congress more often than they had chosen not to do so.
74
Edward A. Kolodziej , op. cit.
,
p. 416.





March 21, 1962, p. 4716.

41
The Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee followed Ford's
speech with one of his own. Addressing the Chair, he stated
Mr. Chairman, I have felt that the language incorporated
in the pending military authorization bill, which directed
the Executive Branch to utilize $491 million for the plan-
ning and production of the RS-70 aircraft was very unwise.
The language raises serious constitutional questions and
tends to bypass the regular procedures which call for
direct action by the Congress on funds recommended by its
appropriations committees before authorized programs may
be executed. 77
Representative Mahon then amplified Representative Ford's arguments with
regard to executive disregard of congressional will. He produced much more
detailed figures, and recited every instance, year by year, wherein the
executive departments had implemented the will of Congress, or disregarded
it, since 1948.
Mahon' s general conclusions, not surprisingly, were the same as
Gerald Ford's, namely, that the executive departments implemented the will
of Congress more often than they did not. These two speeches took much of
the force from Chairman Vinson's argument.
In the face of opposition from the President, the House leadership, and
the determined Appropriation Committee, Vinson capitulated and withdrew the
word "directed" from his amendment. He offered to change that word to
"authorize" as the President suggested. Ford objected that the amendment
would be "poor grammar" with just the straight substitution of words, but
Vinson replied that "the President wants 'authorize' and when the President
78








With the amendment thus watered down, the House passed H.R.9751, as
amended, by a vote of 404-0, with no changes made in the committee recom-
mendations with regard to total funding authorized. One amendment was
offered to require authorizing legislation for appropriations which were
earmarked for research and development on the RS-70 program after December 31,
791961. This amendment carried, on a voice vote.
At the conclusion of House debate on the authorization bill, and after
passage of the modified amendment, Vinson was philosophical. He stated on
the Floor
I say that members of Congress and the public had been
led to believe that here was a fight that would settle
the question of separation of powers as between Congress
and the Executive Branch of government.
I intend to support the bill for I believe this country
must have incomparable defenses, but I deeply regret
that this fight was started, for it is apparent that
now it has been lost.
This is not a compromise; it is a defeat for the entire
House of Representatives. 80
It was revealed that afternoon that Vinson had been invited to the White House
on the previous day for a talk with the President on the RS-70 matter, after
which he had agreed to water down his amendment. In a news conference follow-
ing the passage of H. R. 9751, the President said that "under the American
system of divided powers, only chaos could result from the attempts of one
81
branch to impose its will on another."
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H.R. 9751 was sent to the Senate on March 22, 1962, for hearings before
the Senate Armed Services Committee, all of which were in executive session.
This committee reported the House bill only eleven days later, on 2 April.
The Senate Committee reduced the amounts approved by the House from
$13,065,772,000 to a figure of $12,969,300,000, of which $491 million was to
be available only for research and development and long leadtime planning for
the RS-70 bomber. In addition, the Senate Committee incorporated all military




The Senate Armed Services Committee had kept out of the controversy
raised over the RS-70 bomber in the House. This was interesting in that the
House Committee was essentially trying its wings under the provisions of the
Russell Amendment for the first time, while the authors of that amendment,
Senator Russell and his Armed Services Committee, watched developments in the
House from the sidelines of the controversy. The Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee had held hearings on its version of the military procurement authoriza-
tion bill (S. 2734) from January 19 through February 2, 1962.
In the course of these hearings, the Senate Committee had heard Secre-
tary McNamara review essentially the same arguments against full development
of the RS-70 bomber system that appeared in his news conference of 15 March,
1962. The committee appeared to be well satisfied with McNamara' s testimony,
especially when he pointed out that the RS-70 aircraft had only a very limited
82
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capability in terms of flexibility of mission. It could not be converted to
carry conventional ordance, as could the B-52 and B-47 aircraft, and could
not carry the SKYBOLT air-launched ballistic missile, as could the B-52. In
addition, McNamara asserted that the RS-70 prototypes which would be built in
his limited program would not be convertible to use in a program to develop a
commercial supersonic transport aircraft, due to substantial configuration
differences between the bomber and any transport type aircraft.
On April 11, the Senate passed its Armed Services Committee's version of
H.R. 9751 unanimously, making no changes in the totals. On April 12, the
House accepted the Senate's version of H.R. 9751 with all changes, and sent
the authorization bill to the President for signature.
The Appropriations Committees then took up the Defense budget. The House
Committee on Appropriations reported out H.R. 11,289 (H. Report 1607) in the
amount of $47,839,491,000 for fiscal year 1963. Of this total amount, $223.9
million was slated for the RS-70. The House passed H.R. 11,289 by a 388-0
vote on April 18, with no amendments, and sent it over to the Senate.
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 11,289 out on June 8,
1962, in the amount of $48,429,221,000. Of this total, $491 million was ear-
marked for the RS-70 program, with no particular qualifications. The Senate
passed this bill with an 88-0 vote on June 13, 1962. The Conference Committee
split the difference on the RS-70 appropriation, allowing $362.6 million for
that program.
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Ot the three prototypes planned by Secretary McNamara in 1962, only
two were ever built. The $1.3 billion which the Air Force had said in 1961
would build six prototypes was able to pay for only two aircraft in 1967.
McNamara' s concern over the expense of the RS-70 weapons system were evidently
well founded.
The two prototype aircraft rolled out at the North American Aviation
plant in Los Angeles were designated XB-70, and were used for experiments in
hypersonic flight. The two XB-70' s were never really weapons systems, since
they consisted only of airframes and power plants. The very sophisticated
electronics envisioned in 1962 for the reconnaisance-strike capability were
still not technically feasible when the aircraft rolled out.
XB-70 //l was destroyed in a collision with a public relations firm's
photo aircraft in 1968. The last remaining Valkyrie bomber was retired




In substance, the whole debate on the RS-70 tended toward terms which
had very little to do with the facts of the situation. The debate over the
RS-70 was cast by some in terms of bombers versus missiles. The true issue,
however, was over alternative launching platforms for alternative missile
systems. The Secretary of Defense made a fairly straight-forward decision in
1962, namely, that the RS-70 was neither an effective nor an economical means
o c
to accomplish the missions proposed for it.
The provisions of the Russell Amendment reopened the door for the Armed
Services Committees of both Houses of Congress to review in depth important
procurement programs proposed by the Defense Department. It was the testi-
mony of the Air Force, which conflicted with the views of the Secretary of
Defense on the B-70, that led the House Committee to challenge McNamara, by
authorizing more funds for the B-70 than he had requested.
In terms of costs, the Secretary of Defense made a correct decision on
the B-70/RS-70 program. Costs had gotten out of line with the funds author-
ized for three prototype weapons systems being able to buy only two bare-bones
aircraft. A large production program would have probably encountered the same
mushrooming costs as did the prototype program. This would indicate that
McNamara' s cost-effectiveness criteria were, in this instance, at least point-
ing in the right direction.
The overly enthusiastic support for the RS-70 program given by the Air
Force before congressional committees points to the possibility that the Air
8 S






Force was more interested in maintaining its role in strategic defense than
in procuring a cost-effective weapons system. It should be noted that the
Air Force Chief of Staff claimed that the $1.3 billion authorized for the pro-
gram would procure six prototypes, not, as turned out, just two aircraft.
The RS-70 controversy did demonstrate the need for prototype competition
in major weapons systems procurement programs. The Eisenhower Administration
had actually authorized weapons development level of funding for a program
which had not produced even a test vehicle, and this after more than seven
years of research. The same company had held the contract through the entire
development period, thus there was no element of competition in the RS-70 pro-
gram to provide that company with an incentive to keep costs down.
It is unclear why the House Committee seized upon the RS-70 program to
challenge the Administration on defense procurement. The most likely cause
was the fact that Secretary McNamara had in effect cancelled a major program
after Congress had voiced support for that program. The importance of per-
sonalities cannot be overlooked, however.
In 1962, Representative Vinson was the Dean of the House of Representa-
tives— its most senior member, and chairman of an important committee. As
such, he was accustomed to getting what he wanted in the realm of military
affairs. McNamara' s curt cancellation of the RS-70 program very probably seemed
like an affront to Chairman Vinson.
0(L
On the other hand, no one could have foreseen what problems the B-70 was
going to run into, pointing up once again the uncertain nature of R & D. In




The language of the House Report (1406) which contained the contro-
versial "direction" language bears out this impression. The committee vote
in reporting out the Authorization Bill had been unanimous, but the concern
for the future of manned bombers was not so widespread in the committee as
the report indicated. The strong language in the committee report was almost
certainly the work of the Chairman alone, which gives credence to the impres-
sion that Vinson was highly displeased with McNamara's apparent high-
handedness.
Mr. Vinson had staked the power and prestige of his committee and his
own personal seniority and influence on the outcome of the RS-70 issue. In
so doing, he underestimated the degree of congressional and presidential
opposition that his move would encounter. Many legislators understood that
the political and technical differences over the RS-70 were complex enough
without forcing them into simplified and essentially misleading interpreta-
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tions of Congress' constitutional role in defense policy.
Chairman Vinson's Amendment actually distorted the spirit of the Con-
stitution, in that it implied legislative supremacy in matters of defense
affairs. The Constitution does indeed grant to Congress the exclusive
power to raise and support armies, but nowhere does it provide Congress with
the procedure by which it might exclusively exercise this power.
The Vinson Amendment was a procedural distortion of congressional
authority as well. Congress has sole authority to appropriate money, that is,
to authorize the expenditure of money by its own officers or those in the other
87







branches of the federal government. In the case of the RS-70 program,
The Armed Services Committee was in the unique position of attempting to force
the Executive Branch to spend money it did not want to spend, and which had
not been appropriated by law.
In summation, then, it can be said that Vinson's attempt to write legis-
lation which would direct an executive official to spend money was procedur-
ally improper, constitutionally unfounded, and a political error. It was
also an isolated incident in the history of congressional action in defense
affairs, and should not be used to draw any generalizations about Congress
and its participation in defense policy making. A genuine link does exist,
however, between Vinson's action in the RS-70 controversy and the advent of
the Russell Amendment, from which a general evaluation of the effect and
significance of the Russell Amendment can be made.
The direct link between the Russell Amendment and the RS-70 issue is
that the Russell Amendment called into being annual review of major weapons
system programs before the Armed Services Committees. More importantly, it
required the enactment of legislation which dealt with specific categories of
weapons for all three services, which meant that the authorization hearings
would carry a great deal more weight with other congressmen than the military
posture hearings which preceded the Russell Amendment procedure.
In answering the broader question of the significance of the Russell
Amendment, several criteria may be employed. The first of these is whether
oo






or not the Russell Amendment, or action taken under it, is authorized or
implied in the Constitution, and in conformity with the basic division of
powers between the legislative and Executive Branches. The answer to this
question is clearly affirmative. Congress has both the authority and the
constitutional responsibility to authorize by law any and all programs pro-
posed by the Executive Branch. This power becomes particularly pertinent when
some of the military programs begin to acquire billion dollar price tags, as
did the RS-70 weapons system.
Representative Vinson's move to force the Administration to spend $491
million on the RS-70 weapons system was not in conformity with the basic
division of powers concept, however, but rather a distortion of that concept
which tended in the direction of excessive legislative power. In this con-
text, it was not in conformity with the spirit of the Russell Amendment itself,
which directed that programs required authorization and not compulsion by law.
A second question which may be asked is whether or not the Russell Amend-
ment is helpful in providing Congress with the information it needs to dis-
charge its basic responsibilities. Here again the answer is clearly yes. One
of the fundamental purposes of the new procedure was to increase the base of
knowledge in Congress on matters of defense policy, and indeed to permit mem-
bers of Congress to be able to focus their attention on something more specific
than an aggregated defense budget, namely, those costly weapons systems which
contributed so much to the size of that budget. At the very least, the pro-
cedure permits members to get an idea of how complex a business defense pro-
curement has become in modern times.
A qualification must be made in this regard, however, in that members of
the Armed Services Committee are very probably hard-pressed to absorb the large
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quantities of information which the Defense Department dishes up in the
course of the authorization hearings. Another qualification which must be
made is that the Defense Sub-committee of the Appropriation Committees did
provide a great deal of information to Congress before the Russell Amendment.
But whereas then only one sub-committee provided the bulk of the inputs into
the congressional review process, now there is an additional entire committee
involved.
A third question which may be asked is whether the authorization review
operates in such a way as to allow the Defense Department flexibility in
administering the procurement programs. In this area there could be certain
disadvantages to the new procedure. One which has been mentioned is the diffi-
culty a Pentagon contracting officer will have in negotiating a contract at a
price less than the figures authorized by Congress. Having a dollar authoriza-
tion attached to a weapons system makes bargaining somewhat difficult. The
possibility of such a situation strengthens the argument for prototype competi-
tion before production contracts are let.
Another complicating factor is the long time span over which major weapons
systems are developed and produced. The need for annual review with the
attendant possibilities that the program's authorizations might run into
trouble in Congress leaves the Pentagon with no assurance that major programs
will be seen through to completion. The defense administrator also faces the
problem of having to defend and explain the big programs in duplicate, once
before the Defense Sub-committees of the Appropriations Committee, and once
before the Armed Services Committee. The double presentations certainly add to
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the Pentagon workload, and tend to detract from administrative discretion
89
in managing weapons programs.
A fourth question is whether the authorization procedure as applied re-
flect the wishes of the whole Congress as a body or the wishes of just one
segment of Congress. If the RS-70 controversy is any indication, the Russell
Amendment reinforces the existing divisions in Congress along committee lines
90
at the expense of overall congressional power in defense policy. Opposition
to Vinson's proposed amendment did arise along committee lines, between
Armed Services and Appropriations. It is thus apparent that the Russell Amend-
ment did bring the Armed Services Committee into conflict with the Appropria-
tions defense groups over which House Committee would have the most influence
on defense policy.
On the other hand, Congress as a whole listens to its expert committees
in expressing consensus, and it listened to the Armed Services Committee, in
the case of the FY 1963 military authorization bill, to the tune of 404-0 in
the vote. Thus although the Russell Amendment does emphasize committee divi-
sions in preparing the annual legislation, it does not interfere with the
legislative process at the macro-level of debate and voting. Furthemore, the
committee division emphasized by the Russell Amendment is already nothing more
than the proper division of responsibility between a substantive committee
89
This problem is not unique in government. The Secretary of the Interior
faces it on every hydroelectric project.
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and the Appropriations Committee. The responsibility of the Armed Services
Committee does, after all, have a constitutional origin, and the Russell Amend-
ment simply re-establishes that committee's proper role and function.
A fifth question asks whether the Russell Amendment procedure tends to
strengthen and enforce the internal disciplines of the Executive Branch. There
is little question that it does, inasmuch as the dual annual review require-
ment necessitates that the Defense Department iron out any in-house differences
before going to the Hill for the review process. (There may, however, be a
hidden cost in this feature, because the need for settling service differences
further consolidates executive power in the office of the Secretary of De-
fense. )
Congress has traditionally been interested in hearing two sides to any
major propoaition, and the "united front" presentations by Secretary McNamara
were sometimes viewed with a jaundiced eye by committee members, particularly
when, as in the RS-70 case, high-ranking military officers had views which were
different from the Secretary's position.
Administratively, it is proper that a final policy decision from the top
be supported by all subordinates in all instances. Congressional committees,
however, are rather special cases, in that members are very interested in and
quite expert at surfacing subordinate opposition to high-level final decisions.
Thus the tendency of the new procedure to strengthen and enforce internal dis-
cipline within the Defense Department is compromised somewhat by committee
member and committee staff expertise in probing the depth of internal support
that the major procurement programs have from the military services.
A final criterion is whether or not the review procedure is suitable for
execution by a legislative body. The Russell Amendment certainly added to the
workload of the Armed Services Committees, and added as well to the work of
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Congress as a whole in that it must consider two major legislation
packages
on defense procurement. At the same time, however,
the new procedure doubles
congressional exposure to defense matters, and authorization
hearings and
their reports give the individual member perspective of
defense programs in
relation to national defense strategy, whereas the
appropriation sub-committee
hearings tended to set defense programs in perspective of
the national budget.
In the appropriation hearings, defense programs are evaluated
against a price
tag, while in the Armed Services review, programs are
evaluated against their
contribution to national defense.
The Valkyrie bomber controversy was an important milestone
in the evolu-
tion of Congress' role in national defense policy. It
served to establish
the limits of the review procedure instituted by the
Russell Amendment in
1959, and it marked the return of the Armed Services
Committees, particularly
in the House, to the mainstream of the legislative
process.
The Russell Amendment itself gave to the Armed Services
Committees an
expanded opportunity to review and pass judgement on a sector of national
policy for which they have a long standing responsibility.
While this pro-
cedure may have added to the tensions which exist between
a substantive com-
mittee and the Appropriations Committee, the increased
awareness and knowledge
of defense affairs which the review procedure provides
should well offset its
political drawbacks, and eventually make Congress more
effective in ful-
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